The EU adopted its 21st Russia sanctions package, after exempting a Greek owner's Russian LNG carriers

The European Union's twenty-first Russia sanctions package went through on 23 July. The country that held it up for more than a week was not Hungary but Greece, and what Greece was protecting were the ships of a single national shipowner.

EU agrees 21st sanctions package after Greece lifts veto (The Kyiv Independent, 2026-07-23)

출처: kyivindependent.com

The package carried a clause blocking the carriage of Russian LNG to third countries. Greece lifted its veto only after securing terms under which shipping contracts signed before the invasion may continue, subject to an annual review, with no new contracts allowed.

The shipowner holding the veto

The vessels at issue are LNG carriers built to break through ice. LNG coming out of the Arctic Yamal field has to cross a route that freezes over in winter, so ordinary ships cannot carry it. The fleet that works that route belongs to the Greek shipowner George Prokopiou. If it sounds odd that a handful of ships could stop a decision taken by twenty-seven countries, look at the size of Greek shipping.

What Brussels wants to change

Four days after the package passed, the Financial Times reported that Brussels is redesigning the way sanctions themselves are handled.

EU scrambles to rework Russia sanctions strategy after Greek veto protects shipping magnate's fleet (Business Upturn, 2026-07-27)

출처: businessupturn.com

Two directions are under consideration. One is to stop issuing sanctions as a single large package and instead handle them in small thematic batches, each agreed on its own. The other is to move some foreign-policy decisions from unanimity to qualified majority voting. Both read on the surface as procedural tuning meant to speed approval up. The working effect lies elsewhere, in narrowing the moments at which a member state can reach for its veto. One point has to be made here for the rest to follow. The veto is a power the treaties handed to member states, so removing it means amending the treaties, and amending the treaties requires unanimity again. Slicing the agenda into smaller pieces leaves the power untouched and shrinks the occasions for using it.

The winter where two calendars overlap

As of 29 July, average EU gas storage stood at 55.7 percent. The date on which Russian LNG stops entirely is already fixed, and so is the date by which the tanks are meant to be full.

When the 22nd package arrives

Whether this carve-out was a one-off compromise or one scene in the quiet thinning of the veto will be settled by the shape of the next package. If the 22nd again arrives as one large bundle carried by unanimity, the veto is still alive as a bargaining chip. If sanctions instead come out in small thematic batches handled separately, or if moving foreign-policy decisions to qualified majority voting reaches the Council's formal agenda, this Greek episode stands as the last time a veto was used whole. Europe's timetable for cutting off Russian gas and Europe's timetable for getting through winter sit on the same calendar. Whether that calendar can be run on a rule where one capital's objection stops everything is what this package actually tested.